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The continuing impact of environmental
problems on the law is commanding the
attention of the bar. This article and the
one that follows it trace recent develop-





The 1975 Legislature closed a gap in New
York's environmental laws when it enacted
the State Environmental Quality Review
Act or "SEQR". 1 SEQR requires that all
state and local agencies follow specified
environmental evaluation procedures be-
fore carrying out or approving any action
which may have a significant effect on the
environment. Key provisions require the
completion of a final environmental impact
statement before agency action, and the
making of an explicit factual finding that the
agency action will, according to the Act's
formula, avoid or minimize adverse en-
vironmental effect.
SEQR was to become effective for all
levels of government on June 1, 1976. But
the Act elicited strenuous criticism be-
tween enactment and its effective date.
Some local governments claimed that
SEQR would be financially burdensome
and difficult if not impossible to administer.
Spokesmen for industry and labor claimed
that SEQR, even with a year's lead time,
would delay economic recovery in the con-
The author is affiliated with the Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. in New York City.
I L. 1975, c. 612; N.Y. Env. Con. L. Art. 8.
struction industry. Some state governmen-
tal leaders asserted that the Act's adminis-
trative costs would be needlessly high in a
time of governmental cutbacks.
Apart from criticisms of SEQR itself, one
specific event focused general opposition to
regulation on behalf of environmental val-
ues.
In August 1975, shortly after passage of
SEQR, the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation ("DEC") re-
ceived evidence that the levels of PCBs in
fish far exceeded -Federal Food and Drug
Administration safety levels, and closed
down a portion of commercial fishing on
the Hudson River. The DEC then alleged
that General Electric had been discharging
PCBs, a persistent toxic substance having
carcinogenic properties, into the Hudson
River at Fort Edward and Hudson Falls in
sufficient quantity to contaminate fish
populations and endanger human health.
The DEC took a position on remedy which,
according to General Electric, might cause
the shutting down of their two large
capacitor manufacturing plants.
(Continued on page 112)
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Despite the extensive evidence of a pub-
lic health risk, 2 the General Electric situa-
tion was seen by some people in and out of
government, as proof that strong protection
of the environment was antithetical to eco-
nomic recovery in the state. Such views,
which had been percolating in state gov-
ernment, became public when, in January,
1976, DEC Commissioner Ogden Reid was
publicly criticized by Commissioner John
Dyson of the Department of Commerce.
Commissioner Dyson argued that DEC's
strict environmental enforcement policy
caused economic consequences in excess
of what was necessary to protect public
health.3
In the context of that open controversy
SEQR came in for particular criticism when
the legislative session began in 3anuary,
1976. Dozens of bills were introduced de-
signed to amend or repeal SEQR. Governor
Hugh Carey, however, remained publicly
committed to SEQR and submitted as his
bill a short amendment which left the Act
without change but called instead for a
staged implementation. In his message the
Governor restated his support for SEQR,
but reasoned that the concerns of private
industry and local governments place a
burden on the state government to demon-
strate that the SEQR program is workable
and effective at a reasonable cost.4 The
Governor's Bill, which was enacted, staged
implementation of the Act as follows: 5
September 1, 1976-
Actions directly undertaken by the
state.
June 1, 1977-
Actions directly undertaken by local
agency or actions wholly or partially
state funded.
2 In re General Electric Co., 6 ERC 30007, Feb. 9,
1976.
1 New York Times, January 16, 1976, at 33, col. 5.
4 1976 McKinney's Session Laws A-263, 264.
1 1976 Session Laws, Ch. 228.
September 1, 1977-
Private actions needing state or local
licenses, approval or permits and
locally funded actions.
In the midst of such controversy one
might easily lose sight of the importance of
SEQR as a basic reform in both administra-
tive and environmental law, and of the re-
levance of recent history which clarified the
need for SEQR in the first place. SEQR, it
should first be noted, is not novel legisla-
tion. The Legislature modeled SEQR on
the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 ("NEPA"), the federal statute which
establishes environmental impact proce-
dures for federal agencies, and upon other
state environmental evaluation statutes,
especially that of California. 6 In passing
SEQR, New York joined more than 25
states and more than 60 federal agencies
already following environmental review
procedures.
In the last five years, the New York
Legislature adopted many far-reaching en-
vironmental bills designed to protect par-
ticular environmental values, such as the
Tidal Wetlands Act,7 the Freshwater Wet-
lands Act,8 and the Adirondack Park
Agency Act. 9 But New York lagged behind
in establishing an across-the-board proce-
dure which would resolve the two missing
elements in New York's environmental
regulatory scheme: a generally applicable
environmental evaluation procedure and a
general standard for decision-making which
would balance environmental concerns
against social and economic concerns.
SEQR attempts to fill these gaps. It es-
tablishes a procedural framework in which
to resolve environmental controversies
with finality through an environmental im-
pact statement process, and sets out a
standard by which an agency is to make its
decision. SEQR then is more than an en-
vironmental protection measure; it is an
administrative reform of first importance.
6 1975 Legis. Ann. pp. 217-18, 438-39.
7 N.Y. Env. Cons. L. Art. 25.
8 L. 1975, c.' 614; N.Y. Env. Cons. L. Art. 24.
9 N.Y. Executive L. Art. 27.
NEW YORK STATE BAR JOURNAL, FEBRUARY 1977
Preludes to SEQR
In 1972, the DEC took a first step to-
wards the SEQR concept when it required
by regulation an environmental impact as-
sessment whenever a private applicant
sought any one of six major DEC permits or
approvals: air contamination source con-
struction, public water supply approval, in-
stallation of wells of a certain size on Long
Island, stream protection, municipal waste
disposal system construction, and indus-
trial waste disposal system construction.' 0
The DEC Commissioner under the regula-
tion had the option of requiring or not re-
quiring an applicant seeking such a permit
to submit a detailed analysis of the en-
vironmental effects of the proposed project
or development. If the Commissioner opted
to follow the procedure a public notice was
required and a public hearing might be held
as well. At the public hearing the issue was
whether and to what extent the project or
development would cause irreparable and
irretrievable damage to the environment
and the natural resources of the State of
New York.
The DEC's "environmental impact as-
sessment" procedure was a first step to-
wards a full environmental impact assess-
ment, but it was an inadequate one. It was
discretionary with the Commissioner and
without clear guidelines as to applicability.
Not all state permits were included. It had
no applicability to state or public corpora-
tion projects. The standard for decision was
not set forth with clarity.
The inadequacies of the DEC's regu-
latory procedures were quickly pointed out
in Ton-Da-Lay, Ltd. v. Diamond." Ton-
Da-Lay involved a plan to develop 18,000
acres of forest land in Franklin County into
a second home community. The DEC
Commissioner followed the "environmen-
tal impact assessment" procedure and de-
nied the developer's application for public
water supply and sewage disposal permits.
While the Appellate Division, Third De-
10 6 NYCRR Part 615.
I 44 A.D. 2d 430, 355 N.Y.S. 2d 820 (3rd Dep't
1974).
partment affirmed the Commissioner's de-
nial on appeal, it severely circumscribed
the "environmental impact assessment"
procedure. The Court ruled that the regula-
tion did not reach the required definitive
standards necessary to inform the applicant
of exactly what was required for com-
pliance. The court ruled the regulation in-
adequate, citing the optional nature of the
procedure, the Commissioner's unfettered
discretion to establish guidelines outside
the regulations and the absence of
standards as to what would cause irrepara-
ble and irretrievable damage to the envi-
ronment and natural resources. The court
held in addition that the Commissioner was
without authority to deny the application
on the grounds of aesthetic and ecological
undesirability of the entire project. The
court reasoned that damage to the envi-
ronment must be relegated to its proper
place of importance within the statutory
framework, and that the absence of clearly
defined standards opened the door for
purely subjective decisions.1 2
The court's opinion pointed to major de-
ficiencies in New York's laws. Although
permit programs protective of environmen-
tal values and health had proliferated, each
had separated standards, and not one set
forth general standards on which to balance
overall environmental and ecological val-
ues against other important state concerns.
The procedures were equally unclear. An
optional procedure following optional and
unpublished guidelines satisfied no one.
The absence of settled procedures and
standards for evaluating environmental
concerns regularly appeared in other court
decisions, sometimes favorable to the en-
vironmental values, sometimes unfavora-
ble, but always unpredictable. In Walsh v.
Spadaccia,'3 a court overturned the Town
of Yorktown's site plan approval granting a
builder the right to build 168 apartments on
the shore of Lake Mohegan in Westchester
County. The court held that the local site
12 44 A.D. 2d at 438; 355 N.Y.S. 2d at 828.
13 72 Misc. 2d 866, 343 N.Y.S. 2d 45 (Sup. Ct. West.
Cty. 1973).
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approval was not in conformity with the
Development Plan of the Town because no
prior consideration had been given to the
pollution of Lake Mohegan due to in-
creased septic tank runoff. In Nattin Re-
alty, Inc. v. Ladewig, 14 a developer found
his land lawfully down zoned from garden
apartments to single family homes when it
emerged that his plans for water supply and
sewage disposal inadequately dealt with the
anticipated population permissible under
the zoning. In Gottfried v. New York City
Convention and Exhibition Center Corpo-
ration,I- a court affirmed New York City's
final approval of the construction plans for
a new convention center on the promise of
future environmental review, not existing
review. And in Hamilton v. Diamond,16 a
court approved a DEC permit to enclose
and fill less than an acre of Hudson River
shallows at Grand View-on-Hudson hold-
ing that it was unnecessary to consider the
cumulative environmental effects of many
such small landfills.
But the uncertain situation was most evi-
dent in Lloyd Harbor Study Group, Inc. v.
Diamond.17 In that case the court held that
the DEC Commissioner could "disregard in
total" his hearing examiner's report and the
public hearing on which it was based. The
public hearing concerned water quality cer-
tification with respect to a nuclear generat-
ing station at Shoreham, Long Island. The
court characterized the public hearings as
futile, unnecessary and unfair to the public,
but nevertheless upheld the procedure be-
cause there were neither statutory nor con-
stitutional requirements that the environ-
mental issues be resolved through the hear-
ing process. The court concluded that "un-
til legislation fills the void, the public hear-
14 67 Misc. 2d 828, 324 N.Y.S. 2d 668 (Sup. Ct.
Dutchess Cty. 1971), affjd, 40 A.D. 2d 535, 334 N.Y.S.
2d 483 (2d Dep't 1972), aff d, 32 N.Y. 2d 681, 343
N.Y.S. 2d 360 (1973).
15 172 N.Y.L.J. 17, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Aug.
30, 1974).
16 42 A.D. 2d 465, 349 N.Y.S. 2d 146 (3rd Dep't
1973).
17 78 Misc. 2d 135, 355 N.Y.S. 2d 693 (Sup. Ct.
Albany Cty. (1973).
ings are nothing more than a pro forma
ritual and a hollow exercise by a concerned
public in respect to environmental is-
sues."
18
In response to such decisions, and to a
nationwide consensus supporting environ-
mental impact statement procedures, the
1975 legislature took two decisive steps de-
signed to rationalize environmental
decision-making. The first was directed
specifically at the problems examined in the
Ton-Da-Lay opinion. The second was the
enactment of SEQR.
The legislature dealt with Ton-Day-Lay
by amending § 3-0301 of the Environmen-
tal Conservation Law specifically to au-
thorize the Commissioner, when issuing a
permit or license of any kind, to take into
account the cumulative impact of the pro-
posal on the water, land, fish, wildlife and
air resources of the state. 19 The amendment
did not solve the major procedural prob-
lems, however, including the absence of an
explicit standard or systematic procedures.
That was to come later in the legislative





SEQR begins by stating lengthy Legislative
Findings and Declarations announcing
specific goals, which are reflected in the
Act's substantive provisions. These Legisla-
tive Declarations affirm that maintenance of a
"quality environment," both healthful and
pleasing to the senses, is a "statewide con-
cern" to which every citizen has a responsi-
bility, and that enhancement of human and
community resources depends upon the exis-
tence of a quality physical environment. 20
Equally important, the Legislative Decla-
rations call for the state government to take
immediate steps to identify critical thresholds
18 78 Misc. 2d at 139-40, 355 N.Y.S. ed at 698.
19 L. 1975, c. 532; N.Y. Env. Con. L. § 3-
0301(1) (b).
20 N.Y. Env. Con. L. § 8-0103(1)-(4).
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for public health and safety and to take "all
coordinated actions necessary to prevent
such thresholds from being reached."' 21 It is
the Legislature's goal that "to the fullest ex-
tent possible" the state's policies, statutes,
regulations and ordinances should be inter-
preted and administered in accordance with
SEQR, and to that end, environmental pres-
ervation and protection must be part of each
agency's mandate. When agencies regulate
activities, such values must be given "major
consideration" to prevent environmental
damage. 22
Following these broad, general directions,
SEQR establishes procedures by which the
agencies can enforce and implement their en-
vironmental mandate.
SEQR establishes three affirmative duties:
1. a general, across-the-board requirement
for all state agencies to act and choose
alternatives which, to the maximum ex-
tent practicable, and consistent with so-
cial, economic and other essential con-
siderations on state policy, "minimize
or avoid adverse environmental ef-
fects'; 23
2. a mandatory requirement to prepare
an environmental impact statement
for any action "which may have a sig-
nificant effect on the environment" ;24
3. a mandatory requirement that for any
action which the agency approves, the
agency must make "an explicit finding"
that it has selected the alternative
which, consistent with other essential
considerations of state policy, mini-
mizes or avoids adverse environmental
effects .2
Under SEQR, therefore, all agencies have
an environmental mandate. No agency can
claim that its organic statute prevents consid-
eration of environmental concerns.
With respect to actual preparation of the
environmental impact statement SEQR
lists nine specific areas which must be cov-
21 N.Y. Env. Con. L. § 8-0103(5).
22 N.Y. Env. Con. L. § 8-0103(6)-(9).
23 N.Y. Env. Con. L. § 8-0109(1).
24 N.Y, Env. Con. L. § 8-0109(2).
25 N.Y. Env. Con. L. § 8-0109(8).
ered. These include a requirement to
analyze such matters as adverse environ-
mental effects of the project, alternatives to
the proposed action, mitigation measures,
growth inducing aspects of the proposal
and the effect on energy conservation. 26 To
insure smooth functioning, the Act specifi-
cally provides for coordination with federal
environmental procedures, encourages a
"lead agency" concept when more than
one state agency is involved, allows for
public hearings when justified and au-
thorizes a private applicant to prepare the
environmental impact statement for the
agency or to subsidize the agency's costs
for preparation of the statement. 27
The initial issue with respect to environ-
mental impact statement preparation is, of
course, the threshold test for requiring
preparation of an environmental impact
statement, i.e. what actions "may have a
significant effect on the environment?" The
DEC regulations include both a criteria for
determining what actions meet the Act's
threshold test as well as listing specific
examples as guidelines. 28 The criteria and
examples are useful, but are of necessity
somewhat general in nature and look
largely towards quantitative impact. The
word "significance", however, means of
consequence, a quality which need not be
judged in quantitative terms.
The California Supreme Court has re-
cently interpreted the identical phrase in
the California environmental assessment
statute .29 The California Supreme Court
noted that the California statute, like the
New York statute, sought to offer the ful-
lest possible protection to the environment,
and that the principal method by which en-
vironmental data would be brought to the
attention of the agency and the public is
through preparation of an impact state-
ment. The court, in rejecting a high
threshold, concluded that an agency should
26 N.Y. Env. Con. L. § 8-0109(2).
27 N.Y. Env. Con. L. §§ 8-0109(3)-(6); 8-0111(2)
and (6).
28 6 NYCRR §§ 617.9 and 617.12.
29 Calif. Pub. R-s. C. §§ 21100 et seq.; No Oil, Inc.
v. City of Los Angeles, 529 P. 2d 66 (1975).
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT
prepare an environmental impact statement
whenever it perceives some substantial
evidence that a project may have a signifi-
cant effect environmentally. In support of
its holding, the California Supreme Court
cited approvingly the Second Circuit's rea-
soning that one of the important purposes
of NEPA's impact statement process is to
ensure that the relevant environmental data
are before the agency and considered by it
prior to the decision, and that the statute
must not be construed so as to allow the
agency to make its decision in a doubtful
case without the relevant data or a detailed
study of it.30
On completion of an environmental im-
pact statement, and if the action is ap-
proved, the agency must make an explicit
finding of fact that the goals of the Act have
been met and that all practicable means will
be taken to minimize or avoid adverse en-
vironmental effects.3 1 The substantive fact
finding requirement is a major addition to
the law because it compels the agency to
select among the alternatives the alterna-
tive which, consistent with social and eco-
nomic concerns, will minimize or avoid ad-
verse environmental effects. New York
was, in this respect, ahead of California.
Following New York's lead, this past
summer, California adopted its own formu-
lation of a substantive requirement to
minimize the environmental harms dis-
closed in the statement.32
A key issue with respect to the statutory
finding will be the standard for review in
the event a decision and finding are chal-
lenged. In reviewing other state's statutes
at least two other state's Supreme Courts
have tentatively suggested in dictum that
the courts will review agency decisions.
The California Supreme Court, speaking
generally about review, stated that "obvi-
ously if the adverse consequences to the
environment can be mitigated, or if feasible
30 529 P. 2d at 76-77; Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471
F.2d 823, 837-38 (2d Cir. 1972) (dissent).
31 N.Y. Env. Con. L. § 8-0109(8).
32 California Public Resources Law §§ 21002,
21002.1 and 21081.
alternatives are available, the proposed ac-
tivity, such as the issuance of a permit,
should not be approved."' 33 The Washing-
ton Supreme Court declared that approval
of a project may reveal an abuse of discre-
tion where mitigation or avoidance of dam-
age was possible.34
Claims in New York that feasible, less
damaging actions were available may,
however, run against New York's rules
prohibiting a court from substituting its
judgment for that of the agency. In a recent
New York case involving a somewhat simi-
lar environmental provision the Court of
Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's
decision that the Public Service Commis-
sion acted unreasonably and in abuse of its
discretion when the Public Service Com-
mission did not order transmission lines
placed underground.35 The case arose
under the Transmission Facilities Siting
Act which contains a requirement that any
approved project represent "minimum ad-
verse impact.''36 Although the particular
Act in question limits the scope of review
and is more restrictive in purpose than
SEQR, the Court of Appeals' refusal to
look beyond the traditional standards of re-
view will no doubt be seen as precedent
under the similar minimization requirement
in SEQR.
A more likely task for courts will be to
review the nature of the record and the
rationality of the decision made. Thus, in
another California case, where the agency
ignored adverse environmental effects dis-
closed in the environmental impact state-
ment, and did not explain why practicable
and feasible alternatives were rejected, the
court overturned the decision. 37
33 Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Super Mono
County, 502 P. 2d 1049, 1059 n. 8 (Calif. 1972) (In
Banc).
14 Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke As-
sociates, 513 P. 2d 36, 49 n.6 (Wash. 1973).
31 County of Orange v. Public Service Comm., 37
N.Y.2d 762, 374 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1975), reversing, 44
A.D. 2d 103, 353 N.Y.S. 2d 633 (3rd Dep't 1974).
36 N.Y. Pub. Serv. L. § 126(b).
37 Burger v. County of Mendocino, 45 Cal. App. 3rd
322, 119 Ca. Rptr. 568 (1975).
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Equally relevant are the federal cases
which require that the agency must con-
sider environmental impacts when final de-
cisions are made and that there be objective
and good faith consideration of environ-
mental factors, the so-called "hard
look.'38
The true battleground for SEQR will be
in the agencies. Under SEQR the agency
must balance SEQR's admonition to mini-
mize or avoid adverse environmental ef-
fects against need to act consistent with
social, economic and other essential con-
siderations of state policy. But the Act does
not explain how the decision is to be ar-
rived at and the DEC regulations do not go
much farther than the Act itself. SEQR,
however, is action-forcing in the same
manner as NEPA in that it forces out into
the open the environmental trade-offs,
risks, options and benefits. As one federal
case stated, "at the very least, NEPA is an
environmental full disclosure." 3 9 SEQR
opens the political processes by which
many if not most environmentally impor-
tant decisions are made. The Legislature
reflected that intent in its recitation of find-
ings, referring repeatedly to the need to
create an awareness of and system to give
effective weight to important environmen-
tal values disclosed in the SEQR process.4 0
38 Kleppe v. Sierra Club. 98 S. Ct. 2718, 2731 n. 21
(1976); Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d
1109, 1112-13 n. 5, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
'9 EDF v. Corps. of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749,
759 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
40 N.Y. Env. Con. L. § 8-0101.
It is wrong, SEQR says, to pursue social
and economic goals in ignorance and in dis-
regard to the environmental effects and
risks of that pursuit.
For environmental concerns, SEQR
comes not a moment too soon. The PCB
case against General Electric illuminated
just how important the SEQR type analysis
is, even in the context of specific discharge
standards. In that case the PCB discharge
was in small quantities, about 30 pounds
per day. Yet the chemical and biological
characteristics of PCBs caused the chemi-
cal to accumulate in fish at levels far ex-
ceeding health standards. Through the en-
forcement proceeding the DEC was able to
halt discharge of PCBs, but the questions
left unanswered at the conclusion of the
initial hearing read like an outline for the
environmental assessment that should have
occurred before the discharge began: Are
there any safe or effective means to remove
PCBs from the river bottom once they get
there? Should the user be required to re-
move PCB contaminated earth from around
its plants? Are there any safe substitutes for
PCBs less harmful to the environment? Can
the manufacturer of equipment containing
PCBs be required to insure that the end
user of the product properly disposes of
equipment containing PCBs?
Questions such as these should not be
asked only after catastrophy has struck.
They should be asked in time to avoid or
minimize risks. SEQR provides the proce-
dures for such analysis.
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